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The Naturalist/Reductionist Fallacy
In the second half of the 20th century, literary studies witnessed a dynamic 
expansion of theories of literature that focused on linguistic, formal, 
or structural aspects. The doctrine of textual autonomism which 
emphasized literature’s separateness from the context of its creation, 
and its self-referential, closed character dominated most theoretical 
considerations. Even though this textual paradigm has undergone 
a radical departure from the formalist-structuralist towards post-
structuralist thought, i.e. from the view that literary texts can have clearly 
determined boundaries, and definite, stable structures, shifting its attention 
to the destabilized meaning and the indeterminate, open aspects of texts, 
its basic premises of linguistic and cultural autonomism have remained 
unchanged. However, this view has recently become the target of harsh 
criticism from those who advocate literature’s naturalist and biological 
character, namely Darwinian literary critics. The “Darwinists” claim 
that evolutionary psychology can successfully serve as a bridge between 
the natural sciences and the humanities and that all the phenomena 
belonging to the domain of culture, including art and literature, can 
be explained by reduction to the natural sciences, through the sciences 
of the mind.
In the first part of this article I will enumerate and elaborate upon 
some of the typical claims about textualist literary theory presented by 
Literary Darwinists. Next, I discuss some arguments against textualism, 
put forward by the Darwinists. Finally, I argue that even though the 
Darwinists point out some crucial problems of textualism, their arguments 
for the naturalization of literary studies are flawed and repeat one of 
the major fallacies of textualism, that is, the reductionist claim that the 
concept of literature in all its scope (in the Darwinists’ program this 
includes, on the hand its forms, themes, structures, and on the other 
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hand, the readers’ need for consuming fiction, as well as the principles 
that govern interpretation and appreciation), can be explained entirely in 
terms of a different phenomenon. Just as formalist theories tried to define 
literature by reference to a special, literary use of language, or Marxists 
defining it as the product of certain social conditions, Darwinists see 
literature exclusively as a product of the homo sapiens brain which reflects 
its evolutionary history and is used as a tool for the biological organism’s 
adapting to its environment. The Darwinists’ programme for literary 
studies has its merits, but it cannot overcome the problems that stem 
from accepting reductionism in literary studies.
The work that lays at the foundations of the Darwinist paradigm 
for literature, Joseph Carroll’s Evolution and Literary Theory, begins 
with a harsh attack on what Carroll sees as the major fallacies of post-
structuralism. It is crucial to notice that Literary Darwinists define 
themselves and to a large extent base their paradigm on the supposed 
radical opposition to post-structuralism. The positions which Carroll 
opposes and which he deems the basic premises of post-structuralism 
include textualism and indeterminacy.
Textualism is the idea that language or culture constitute or construct 
the world according to their own internal principles, and indeterminacy 
identifies all meaning as ultimately self-contradictory. Textualism 
treats human beings and the world in which they live as the effects of 
a linguistic or cultural system, and indeterminacy reduces knowledge 
to the spontaneous generation of internal contradictions within this 
system.1
Carroll develops his criticism by adding that textualism entails 
radical constructionism which rejects either the existence of external, 
non-linguistic reality, or the possibility of accessing it. This brings his 
understanding of post-structuralism close to some form of linguistic 
idealism. Post-structuralism’s major flaw is, according to Carroll, its 
supposed insistence on the primacy of language and interpretation over 
its objects, and consequently, the denial of existence of any objects prior 
to its linguistic/interpretive construction. The Darwinists claim that by 
rejecting the basic criterion of truth, i.e. its correspondence to some 
external reality, post-structuralism deprives itself of the only tribunal that 
is able to demarcate the valid, verifiable claims, from the non-verifiable 
babble. If the study of literature is to deliver any valuable information, 
it has to be congruent with the total body of scientific knowledge, and 
since, according to the Darwinists, in the hierarchy of sciences, the hard 
natural sciences provide the most fundamental, and the most reliable 
1 Joseph Carroll, Evolution and Literary Theory (Columbia: UMP, 1995), p. 2.
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insights about the world, all the other disciplines must be eventually 
reducible to the language of physics. If literature is a creation of the 
human imagination, of the human mind, its systematic study must be 
consilient and up-to-date with contemporary psychology.2 Specifically, as 
the Darwinists claim, it has to be consilient with evolutionary psychology, 
because the latter supposedly provides the only coherent and reliable view 
of the development and evolution of the human mind, and consequently, 
of its products. 
One can easily note that this insistence on establishing a definite 
criterion of demarcation of the empirically testable from the non-
testable is akin to the logical positivists’ paradigm in philosophy, and 
it is perhaps true that Darwinists represent a new variety of neopositivist 
thinking which, yet again tries to subordinate the humanities to the 
natural sciences. This becomes especially clear when looking at Carroll’s 
remarks on what he calls the second key feature of post-structuralism, 
that is, indeterminacy. In the neopositivist outlook, indeterminacy is 
a logical consequence of textualism. If one rejects the idea of the unity of 
knowledge where all of its branches are eventually reducible to empirical 
sciences, then one loses the only tool with which one can separate true 
knowledge from the unverifiable gibberish. Thus, without demarcation 
all the produced “knowledge” must predictably fall into the category of 
the indeterminate. According to the Darwinists, every study of culture 
and its creation (including art and literature) must be entirely congruent 
with physicalist theories, through gradual reduction of the total body 
of knowledge that it produces to the empirical claims, or else it cannot 
produce reliable knowledge. It is now easily observable that Carroll’s target 
is textualism itself, as indeterminacy is simply its necessary, predictable 
conclusion. Of course, textualism, in the sense in which Carroll uses 
this term, is something much broader than any deliberations concerning 
the status of literary knowledge. As was indicated above, he seems to 
be suggesting that textualism is a form of idealism, in the sense of 
rejecting the possibility of accessing any empirical, non-linguistic reality, 
which again reminds one of the neopositivist attacks on traditional 
metaphysics. If Carroll defines textualism as the claim that the study of 
human creativity is fundamentally separate, and autonomous from the 
hard, natural sciences, then it is hardly surprising to note that what he 
really attacks is the Diltheyan distinction into Naturwissenschaften and 
Geisteswissenschaften. Textualism is merely a contemporary restatement 
of the 19th-century claim about the humanities being methodologically 
separate from the natural sciences. 
2 Carroll, Evolution and Literary Theory, pp. 2–3.
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The reductionist attack on the methodological autonomy of the 
humanities is also present in the works of Jonathan Gottschall, one of 
Carroll’s Darwinian associates. Gottschall suggests that the birth of post-
structuralist theory was motivated by purely political factors. The major 
figures of the so-called French Theory who lay the foundations for post-
structuralism in the late 1960s saw themselves as being in “the vanguard 
of noble movements of social liberation and transformation.”3 According 
to Gottschall, the overwhelming atmosphere of revolutionary change, the 
zeitgeist perhaps, shaped the whole paradigm for the humanities. Its aim 
was not to study the creations of the human mind in order to produce 
reliable knowledge, but to use them instrumentally to bring about social 
change. This required questioning of the allegedly widespread perception 
of social status was viewed as something natural. In Gottschall’s words 
“literary scholars embarked upon a great project of denaturalization. 
They set out to show that almost everything that people considered to be 
‘natural’ – gender roles, sexual orientations, suites of attitudes, ideologies, 
and norms – were actually the local, contingent, and endlessly malleable 
outgrowths of specific historical and social forces. In Roland Barthes’ 
sense, they were all ‘myths,’ designed to ‘transform history into nature,’ 
to give ‘a historical intention a natural justification,’ and therefore to 
make ‘contingency appear eternal.’ ”4
As a digression, it is extremely interesting that Gottschall presents 
a radically historicist determinist interpretation of post-structuralism, 
where the movement is seen as but a reflection of the general political 
radicalism and the turmoil of the epoch. Rather than focusing on 
rebutting their arguments head-on, as an equal opponent, he places 
himself in an elevated position from which he deems the whole discourse 
inadequate. This favouring of historicist reductionism is in stark contrast 
to Gottschall’s vision of evolutionary psychology as the hegemonic 
discourse of the humanities, but it is less paradoxical when one notices 
that the drive towards reductionism, albeit reductionism of a different 
sort, tends to be the key point of the Darwinian paradigm. Consequently, 
the reductionist view which the Darwinists attack bears many affinities 
with their own stance. This point will be elaborated upon later in the 
article.
Gottschall enumerates what he sees as the key points of post-
structuralism. For him, they include:
3 Jonathan Gottschall, Literature, Science, and a New Humanities (New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2008), p. 4.
4 Gottschall, Literature, Science, and a New Humanities, p. 4.
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1. Active commitment to achieving radical or progressive political 
ends through scholarly means.
2. A ‘nurturist’ commitment to theories of strong sociocultural 
constructivism and a rejection of biological ‘essentialisms.’
3. An epistemology strongly influenced by – if not directly based 
upon – post-structuralist antifoundationalism.5
Since, as the Darwinists argue, post-structuralism is based on political 
rather than factual claims, there is a tremendous need to alter both the 
theory and the practice of literary studies. If literary scholars cannot 
produce reliable knowledge due to methodological limitations, the most 
important step in this alteration is to provide a stable bridge between 
the natural sciences and the humanities which would guarantee the 
necessary flow of hard, scientific data to the study of human creations. 
Predictably, because the Darwinists claim that research in the humanities 
is in fact research into the creations of the human mind, there is a need 
to incorporate some insights from evolutionary psychology. As they 
claim, it is the only discipline which successfully bridges biology and 
the study of the mind, and, thus, by being reducible to hard science, 
it can produce accurate information concerning the human mind and 
its creations.
Carroll enumerates four key, biological concepts of the positive aspect 
of the Darwinist programme, which he contrasts with post-structuralist 
denaturalization. The first of them is the centrality of “the relationship 
between the organism and its [biological] environment.”6 The second is 
that some “innate psychological structures – perceptual, rational, affective 
– have evolved through an adaptive process of natural selection” due to 
interactions with the natural environment; consequently, they “regulate 
the mental and emotional life of all living organisms.”7 The third point is 
that all “human motives are regulated by the principles of inclusive fitness 
as the ‘ultimate cause’.”8 The reproductive success which allowed the 
handing down of evolved mental traits also indicates that “reproductive 
success, in its twin aspects of sexual union and the production of 
offspring, is central to human concerns and thus to literary works.”9 The 
last point is that literature, “literary representation, is a form of ‘cognitive 
mapping’ […] representation is an extension of the organism’s adaptive 
5 Gottschall, Literature, Science, and a New Humanities, p. 6.
6 Carroll, Evolution and Literary Theory, p. 2. 
7 Carroll, Evolution and Literary Theory, p. 2.
8 Carroll, Evolution and Literary Theory, p. 3.
9 Carroll, Evolution and Literary Theory, p. 3.
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orientation to an environment […].”10 In other words, literature serves 
two purposes: it contains stories which eventually concern the central 
problems of human survival, prosperity and reproductive success, but 
those stories also have an adaptive function, as they are read to enhance 
our ability to understand and refer ourselves to the environment, thus, 
potentially helping to increase our chances to survive and thrive.
The role of Darwinian literary criticism is twofold. On the one hand, 
it is supposed to illuminate the sometimes latent functioning of 
Darwinian motives in literature, and on the other hand, to demonstrate 
how they can serve the educational purpose, increasing our understanding 
of the mechanisms of survival and successful reproduction. Both the 
results of such analyses and the evolutionary assumptions concerning 
the adaptive value of literature have already been both criticised and 
mocked in academia,11 and I am not going to investigate them at 
length, interesting as they may be. Instead, I will concentrate on their 
theoretical implications, in an attempt to identify the problems with 
reductionism as such.
First of all, the view that evolutionary psychology constitutes not 
only the successful link between the humanities and the sciences, but 
also the only link possible is of course highly controversial. Such a link 
would have to be based on some incontrovertible evidence of solving the 
mind-body problem. But the debate on this dilemma in contemporary 
philosophy is far from concluded. Needless to say, those philosophers 
who represent the radically naturalist and reductionist position on 
this issue, such as Paul Churchland,12 are far from gaining a dominant 
position in the dispute. 
The second quandary concerns the reduction of the contents of literary 
narratives to basic strategies for survival and reproduction, as if literature 
was a medium for the virtual testing of survival-related hypotheses about 
the modes of behaviour for real life situations. As some examples of the 
Darwinian analyses show, this entails treating works like Homer’s Illiad as 
“a drama of naked apes strutting, preening, fighting, tattooing their chests 
and bellowing their power in fierce competition for social dominance, 
10 Carroll, Evolution and Literary Theory, p. 3.
11 Norman Holland, Literature and the Brain (Gainesville: The PsyArt Foundation, 
2009), p. 331; Norman Holland, “How the Literary Darwinists Got it Wrong,” Psychology 
Today, accessed 6 September 2010, http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/is-your-brain-
culture/201009/how-the-literary-darwinists-got-it-wrong; Eugene Goodheart, “Do We 
Need Literary Darwinism?” Style vol. 42, no. 2/3 (2008), p. 182.
12 Paul Churchland, “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes,” 
Journal of Philosophy, vol. 78 (1981), pp. 67–90.
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desirable mates and material resources,”13 or treating Jane Austen’s novels 
as a simulation of mating and spouse selection strategies.14 
There is no need to mention any inadequacies of such interpretations, 
eccentric as they may be, on the condition that such research is akin to 
what has been sometimes called “cookie cutter theory,” that is, analysing 
a literary text strictly through the lens of some external theory, rather than 
looking at literature as literature. In this respect, Darwinian literary studies 
would be no different than Marxist, psychoanalytic, deconstructionist, 
feminist, or other varieties of literary theory which tend to treat literary 
material as something essentially non-literary, that is, as a reflection of 
the relations of power, as a reservoir of hidden desires, as a repository of 
patriarchal ideology, and so on. In that sense, evolutionary psychology 
becomes just another theory on the list.
The Darwinists, however, oppose this view, indicating that their 
programme is different because of the special status of evolutionary 
psychology. Unfortunately, the idea that Darwinian interpretations are the 
only true explanations of the nature of human mind’s creation would be 
tenable only if we assume that the mind-body problem has been solved, 
and all the contents of the human psyche are reducible to biological 
phenomena. As was already mentioned, this is extremely problematic.
Furthermore, the debate about the status of the contents of literary 
narratives does not exhaust the list of methodological problems that 
Darwinists face. One can hardly believe that Carroll and others embrace 
the naïve perception that literature is a set of relatively separate stories 
which are simply waiting, one by one, to be explained by the naturalist. 
The way we construe, understand and evaluate literary narratives hardly 
ever depends on identifying their merits defined as communication 
of important survival-related features, but rather, among other things, 
it is based on the narratives’ mutual interrelatedness, their place in 
the literary tradition and history, their relation to the canon and to 
artistic conventions. Literary texts do not exist in a vacuum, but can 
only exist in terms of certain institutions, in terms of sets of certain 
practices. That is to say, it is highly problematic to treat literature as 
a natural object that of itself manifests certain properties, for they can 
only be understood and appreciated by a reader who is familiar with 
the rules that govern the practice. As one of the advocates of this view 
13 Interview with Jonathan Gottschall, “Shakespeare Meets the Selfish Gene,” SEED 
February/March 2006, http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/shakespeare_meets_the_
selfish_gene/.
14 Brian Boyd, “Jane, Meet Charles: Literature, Evolution, and Human Nature,” 
Philosophy and Literature, no. 22 (1998), pp. 1–30; Joseph Carroll, Reading Human Nature: 
Literary Darwinism in Theory and Practice (New York: SUNY Press, 2011), pp. 160–161.
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claims: “the existence of literary works depends on a set of conventions 
concerning how they are created, appreciated and evaluated; in other 
words, on attitudes, expectations, and responses found in authors and 
readers.”15 Clearly, these cannot be reduced to purely mental creations, or 
evolutionarily established behaviours. Moreover, if there is a special role 
for literature in our lives, as the Darwinists suggest, this role must be due 
to the differences between the literary, artistic merits of narratives, and 
the stories we normally include in everyday conversations, in newspapers, 
commercials, computer games, etc. 
Consequently, what should really be significant for the long-term 
human survival, according to the Darwinist logic, is the artistic, rather 
than purely thematic aspect of literature. To show this, one would have to 
demonstrate how the features that make up the artistic nature of literary 
institutions can be reduced to evolutionary psychology’s total body of 
knowledge. This, however, seems to be impossible. One can, no doubt, 
attempt to correlate the hypothetical increase in the chances of survival 
and reproduction with some posited rates of artistic value inherent to 
specific literary works, but then one would have to formulate a separate 
theory of the aesthetic values for literature. Darwinists not only fail to 
specify what they mean by the idea of artistic literariness, but even if 
they did, that kind of definition would be insufficient, due to literature’s 
embeddedness in social institutions, and quite definitely non-evolutionary 
sets of material practices which constitute how readers interpret and 
appreciate art. Any explanation of the evolutionary value of literature 
would have to go beyond the notion of artistic “literariness” (whatever 
it may be) and also encompass many purely institutional, rather than 
formal or thematic, facts and procedures concerning literature. 
As Patrick Colm Hogan has observed, even the most basic concepts 
germane to literary studies, such as a writer’s reputation, can in no way 
be accounted for on evolutionary grounds: 
Consider, for example, something as central to literary study as 
reputation. It seems clear that, say, Shakespeare’s reputation is the 
result of many factors. Some involve the possibility of making use 
of his work ideologically, as in the wartime cooptation of Henry V. 
Some involve the political economy of publication (e.g., the 
ownership of copyright – see Taylor). Some involve Shakespeare’s 
incorporation into the English education system and the spread 
of that system via colonialism. Some involve network factors, 
such that Shakespeare connections reached a tipping point, while 
15 Peter Lamarque, The Philosophy of Literature (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), p. 62.
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those for other writers did not. The list could be extended almost 
indefinitely. None of these explanatory systems is evolutionary.16 
Hogan’s argument is lucid and compelling, and the question he 
asks might easily be transposed to other issues. Would the Darwinists 
claim that Shakespeare’s position is entirely due to his touching upon 
some questions important for our survival? Would Joyce’s artistic merit 
lie solely in his skillful treatment of the issues concerning human 
reproduction? And how could that be measured, or artistically vindicated 
when compared to treatment of such questions in popular fiction, 
romance, or pornography? Art, just like literature, is clearly not reducible 
to evolutionary psychology.
Literary Darwinists have not been the first to posit a reductionist 
programme for literature. The idea that in order to produce a comprehensive 
account of literature, the concept needs to be reduced to a completely 
different class of phenomena seems widespread in many theories. One 
might mention the formalists or the structuralists who attempted to define 
literature in linguistic terms, through its supposed density of specific 
linguistic devices, or in the case of post-structuralists, the uncontrollable 
character of the language itself. The Marxist literary theory attempted to 
define literature by identifying the social conditions that produced it, while 
psychoanalysis sees literature as a repository of unconscious wishes and 
desires. Gottschall’s example was paradoxical. Not only is he a follower of 
one type of reductionism, but he accuses his post-structuralist adversaries 
of supporting a flawed version of it, which he denigrates with the help of 
another form of reductionist thinking. 
The perpetual inability to account for literature’s artistic nature by 
the aforementioned theories leads to one conclusion: literature can 
only be successfully defined in a non-reductionist way. Ironically, most 
contemporary literary theories either question or marginalize literature’s 
artistic nature, which somehow deters them from formulating adequate 
aesthetic definitions. They can be found, however, outside literary theory, 
in the works of the analytic philosophy of literature.
One of the earliest works devoted to the problems of literature written 
in the analytic tradition, S. Olsen’s Structure of Literary Understanding, 
explores the roots of reductive definitions of literature. He suggests that 
they stem from the fact that literature is composed of language, which 
means that whatever meaning we construe, or significance we attribute 
to it, or whatever artistic merits we ascribe to it, is all mediated through 
16 Patrick Colm Hogan, “For Evolutionary Criticism, Against Genetic Absolutism,” 
Style 2008, 42, no. 2/3, p. 202.
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language; therefore, it is tempting to try to define literature in purely 
linguistic terms. For instance, when Olsen mentions the semantic 
theories of literature, or suggests that literature is reducible to a certain 
use of language, he is also proposing that the thickness of artistic means, 
increases the texts’ suggestiveness and richness of meaning.17 However, 
as he observes, it is not possible to explain readers’ or critics’ interpretive 
choices when based exclusively on textual material. The range of possible, 
or acceptable meanings that one attributes to a passage in a literary text 
when making an interpretation is always founded upon the understanding 
of literary conventions which free the range of interpretations. What is 
acceptable, is supported by an extratextual knowledge concerning the 
procedures of interpretation. Structural theories, which Olsen deems as 
comparable, tend to treat the literary work like a sentence, that is, as 
an entity constituted of smaller, distinguishable morphological units 
with a specific syntax and grammar. This is, however, a poor analogy, as 
obviously, sentences can acquire radically different meanings, depending 
on a context (this is congruent with J.L. Austin’s work on speech acts, 
to which Olsen is indebted). Moreover, the structuralist analogy fails 
to account for the meaning of longer passages of texts: “There are no 
recognizable larger articulations in a literary work which are parallel to 
the phrases in a sentence.”18 Consequently, Olsen claims it is absurd to 
define literature by reducing it to structural units: 
The structuralist theory fails at the same crucial point as the 
semantic theory. The underlying assumption is that institutional 
practices like literature are objectively given phenomena which 
can be studied from the outside. If you look long enough and 
hard enough at a sufficient number of literary works, certain 
structural units will start to appear, and you can go ahead and 
construct a second-order language. But this is nonsense. Literary 
works will only reveal their features to those who know literary 
practice.19 
A similar version of a naturalist fallacy, that is, the idea that literary 
works can exist as objects independent of an institutional context is also 
present in the Darwinist literary theory, as Hogan has suggested. These 
theories seem to be also connected with the reductionist programme, as they 
all posit that a comprehensive definition of literature entails its reduction 
17 Stein H. Olsen, The Structure of Literary Understanding (Oxford: OUP, 1976), 
p. 12.
18 Olsen, The Structure of Literary Understanding, p. 19.
19 Olsen, The Structure of Literary Understanding, p. 21.
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to other phenomena. Peter Lamarque adds that a successful philosophy 
of literature should avoid the following forms of reductionism:
• to any one literary form (such as poetry),
• to purely linguistic properties (semantic, syntactic, or rhetorical),
• to formal properties (such as style or structure),
• to purely hedonistic conceptions of pleasure,
• to intuitive, ‘natural’ or untutored ‘responses’, and
• to any form of ‘art for art’s sake’ aestheticism.20
What is possibly left, is the idea of literature as an act, rather than an 
object. As Olsen claims, literature consists both of linguistic and non-
linguistic factors. Act-theories “conceive of the literary work as a piece of 
intentional behaviour. As intentional behaviour, the work is directed at 
some response in the receiver, and it is the intention which the receiver 
attributes to the producer as a result of his consideration of the text which 
decides whether the reader is willing to see the utterance as a literary 
work or not.”21
It is clear, then, that Darwinist reductionism fails precisely in the same 
respect as many other literary theories which have ignored the necessity 
of incorporating the institutional aspect of literature into the very core 
of their philosophical considerations. This does not mean, however, that 
the Darwinian literary programme is entirely wrong. It can definitely 
introduce valuable insights concerning the psychological or cognitive 
aspects of literary studies, but it is not able to explain the total body 
of knowledge related to the institution of literature using evolutionary 
psychology. The binary opposition between nature and culture, which 
the literary Darwinists want to overcome by means of reductionism, 
is itself a myth. As knowledge taken from the empirical and psychological 
sciences penetrates the humanities, we can clearly see that the relation 
between the two is more complex and subtle than it might have appeared 
in Dilthey’s times. Consequently, it is not the case that the reductionism of 
literature to the hard sciences is unnecessary, but rather that reductionist 
theories face insurmountable problems on the basic level of literature’s 
definition and, as such, become a philosophical cul-de-sac.
20 Peter Lamarque, “Literature and Aesthetics: A Problematic Relation?” Philosophical 
Studies, no. 135 (1), 2008, p. 8. 
21 Olsen, The Structure of Literary Understanding, p. 5.
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Błąd naturalizmu/redukcjonizmu
Streszczenie
Celem artykułu jest przyjrzenie się neodarwinistycznej teorii literatury, ze szczegól-
nym uwzględnieniem roli sztuki w ujęciu psychologii ewolucyjnej. Według literaturo-
znawców darwinistów, funkcjonowanie literatury na poziomie zarówno form i konkret-
nych treści w niej zawartych, jak i jej znaczenie dla człowieka można wyjaśnić jedynie 
dzięki umiejscowieniu jej w teoretycznych ramach psychologii ewolucyjnej. Zabieg ten, 
zgodnie z poglądami darwinistów, ma wykazać, że z jednej strony sztuka od zawsze ko-
munikuje człowiekowi treści związane z biologicznie rozumianym przetrwaniem i repro-
dukcją, a z drugiej strony sama służy jako narzędzie adaptacyjne, dzięki któremu homo 
sapiens jest w stanie z większą, ewolucyjnie rozumianą, korzyścią odnieść się do swojego 
środowiska.
Nieodłącznym elementem neodarwinistycznej teorii jest jej atak na poststrukturalny 
paradygmat badawczy, który rozumiany jest jako próba zredukowania pojęcia literatury 
do bezkontekstowego i nieokreślonego tworu językowego, który nie uwzględnia tego, że 
sztuka tworzona jest przez i dla ewolucyjnie ukonstytuowanych organizmów żywych, 
a zatem zainteresowanie jej różnymi formami, jakie wykazują wszelkie kultury i epoki, 
nie może zostać zignorowane w ewolucyjnej refleksji nad człowiekiem.
Posiłkując się pracami współczesnych teoretyków estetyki analitycznej, autor usiłuje 
wykazać, że literaturoznawcy darwiniści, jak i wielu teoretyków literatury przed nimi, 
sami padają ofiarą uproszczonego redukcjonizmu. Literatura jako zjawisko o charakterze 
instytucjonalnym, tj. zależnym w swoim istnieniu od szeregu konwencjonalnych ustaleń 
dotyczących zasad jej tworzenia, warunków jej odbioru (interpretacji, ewaluacji), nie może 
zostać zredukowana do zjawisk psychologicznych czy biologicznych, ponieważ samo po-
jęcie literatury istnieje wyłącznie w ramach wspomnianych kategorii instytucjonalnych. 
Pominięcie instytucjonalnego charakteru literatury sprawia, że teoria darwinistyczna nie 
jest w stanie dokonać rozróżnienia między literaturą, jako formą sztuki, a innymi języ-
kowymi wytworami człowieka, którym również, w myśl logiki neodarwinistów, można 
przypisać charakter adaptacyjny w stopniu nie mniejszym niż sztuce. 
Bartosz Stopel
Naturalismusfehler/Reduktionismusfehler
Zusammenfassung
Der Zweck des Essays ist, die neodarwinistische Literaturtheorie unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung der Rolle von der Kunst nach Auffassung der evolutionären Psychologie 
zu erforschen. Die Literaturwissenschaftler-Darwinisten vertreten die Meinung, dass die 
Literatur auf der Ebene sowohl der Formen und konkreten Inhalte, als auch deren Be-
deutung für den Menschen sich nur auf dem Gebiet der Evolutionspsychologie erklären 
lässt. Solche Maßnahme soll nachweisen, dass die Kunst einerseits dem Menschen schon 
immer die mit biologischem Überleben und Reproduktion verbundenen Inhalte mitteilt, 
andererseits aber ist sie ein Anpassungswerkzeug, dank dem der Homo sapiens im Stande 
ist, sich seiner Umwelt gegenüber zum Nutzen zu verhalten. 
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Ein untrennbares Element der neodarwinistischen Theorie ist deren Angriff auf das 
poststrukturelle Forschungsparadigma, das den Begriff „Literatur“ auf ein kontextloses 
und unbestimmtes Sprachgebilde zu beschränken versucht. Das Sprachgebilde berück-
sichtigt dabei nicht, dass die Kunst von den evolutionistisch konstituierten Lebewesen für 
evolutionistisch konstituierte Lebewesen geschaffen ist. Also das von allen Kulturen und 
Epochen gezeigte Interesse an verschiedenen Kunstformen darf bei evolutionärer Reflexi-
on über den Menschen nicht missachtet werden. 
Sich auf die Arbeiten der gegenwärtigen Theoretiker der analytischen Ästhetik stüt-
zend versucht der Verfasser nachzuweisen, dass die Literaturwissenschaftler-Darwinisten 
als auch viele Literaturtheoretiker vor ihnen, dem vereinfachten Reduktionismus zum 
Opfer fallen. Die Literatur als ein institutionelles Phänomen, das von einer ganzen Reihe 
von konventionellen Bestimmungen über Schaffensprinzipien und Rezeptionsbedingun-
gen (Interpretation, Evaluierung) abhängt, darf nicht auf psychologische oder biologische 
Erscheinungen reduziert werden, denn der Literaturbegriff selbst existiert lediglich im 
Rahmen der genannten institutionellen Kategorien. Die Nichtbeachtung des institutio-
nellen Charakters der Literatur verursacht, dass darwinistische Theorie nicht im Stande 
ist, zwischen der Literatur als einer Kunstform und anderen Sprachgebilden des Men-
schen, denen laut der neodarwinistischen Logik einige, für die Kunst typische Adaptati-
onsfähigkeiten zugeschrieben werden können, zu unterscheiden. 
